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RECENT DECISIONS
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR RAPE WHERE VICTIM'S LIFE NEITHER TAKEN NOR ENDAN-
GERED-Ralph v. Warden
Throughout history societies have attempted to influence behavior and
maintain order through the use of sanctions imposed by custom, tradition
and law.' Various methods and degrees of punishment have been exacted
for anti-social behavior;2 each individual society fixing its own value upon
the interest to be protected3 and its interest in punishing the offender." Some
civilizations have utilized torture, maiming and, not infrequently, cruel and
painful deaths as punishment for crimes.'
1 See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1; J. Hall, Readings in Juris-
prudence 857 (1938); Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of
Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supre-ne Court, 16 STAN. L. REv. 996 (1964).2 The method and degree of punishment expresses society's disapproval of a given
act. See, e.g., State v. Borgstrom, 69 Minn. 508, 520, 72 N.V. 799, 803 (1897) where
the court recounted:
By the Roman law a parricide was punished by being sewed up in a leather sack
with a live dog, a cock, a viper and an ape, and cast into the sea.
See also Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987 (1940).
3 Society seeks to preserve life by making murder a crime and therefore punishable.
Likewise, property is protected by punishing acts of larceny, and property and
persons are guarded by punishing for crimes such as robbery, burglary and arson.
The value placed upon these interests varies with the time and with circumstances
in a given society. For instance, the Roman civil law prescribed death for the crime
of rape, while early Jewish law prescribed death only if the victim was betrothed
to another. If the victim was not betrothed, Jewish law required the ravisher to pay
fifty shekels to the girl's father and marry the victim. Saxon law also prescribed
death for rape. Later English law exacted castration and blinding, and for a short
period reduced the crime of rape to a mere misdemeanor, though it was later raised
to a felony. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210-13; Cohen, Moral Aspects
of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987 (1940). See also Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).4 See, e.g., 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISORY oF ENGLISH LAW 451 (2d ed.
1968) (criminal punishment has at times been a great source of revenue as well as
a means to inflict painful retribution upon offenders).
6 Barbarous practices were utilized under the guise of authoritarian control of
society and were administered with passion, prejudice, ill will and other unworthy
motives. Such methods as death by burning, crucifixion, disembowelling and drawing
and quartering were used during the Middle Ages up to the time of the Magna Carta.
See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, concurring)
(cruel punishments for being insane); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940)
(drawing and quartering, torture on the rack and thumbscrew).
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In response to this history of barbarous punishment the Eighth Amend-
ment to the Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishments was adopted.6 However, what constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishments has not been explicitly defined by our courts.' Subse-
quently, there is no all-encompassing definition of "cruel and unusual"
though there have been attempts to define it. Some courts have interpreted
the Eighth Amendment as proscribing only those punishments deemed cruel
and unusual by the framers of the constitution' while others have given
it a more liberal and flexible interpretation.'
Generally, evolving concepts of decency and fairness within the limits
of the standards of civilized society are considered with respect to the nature
of the crime and the culpability of the defendant.'0 It is consistently held
that, to meet constitutional standards, the punishment must be propor-
tionate to the crime."1 Sentences that are excessive in length, 2 inherently
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
The phrase "cruel and unusual" first arose legislatively in the English Bill of
Rights although its origins are said to stem from the Magna Carta. 4 V. Bcisrom,
COmm.NTARES *379. It was included in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1766, and
James Madison incorporated it into his 1789 draft of the constitutional amendments.
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Mo. 1964). See generally
Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 846 (1961) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Note].
7 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947) (dissent); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903); Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Cal. 1966) (prison treatment).
8 See, e.g., Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1969) where the court stated
that the Constitution makes it plain in the grand jury clause, the double jeopardy
clause, and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment that the framers deemed
the death penalty valid. See also Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109 S.E. 582
(1921).
9 Most courts recognize that it is a flexible concept that, by its very nature, must
continue to change. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (the meaning must be "wider . . . than the mischief
which gave it birth."). See generally N.Y.U. Note, supra note 6, at 850 n.27.
'OSee, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910); United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970); Faulkner v.
State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374
(Ky. 1968). See also Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915).
11 See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Faulkner v. State, 445
P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952); State v.
Driver, 78 N.C. 423 (1878); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
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cruel, 3 or dehumanizing' 4 in effect may fall within this prohibition. The
basic concept governing the application of the Eighth Amendment is the
dignity of man. 5
Statutes authorizing wide ranges of penalties without standards by which
they are to be administered are particularly susceptible to abuses of discre-
tion that may result in sentences so inordinately excessive or unusual that
they violate the Eighth Amendment. 6 This principle has recently been
applied to the states by incorporation of the Eighth Amendment into the
Fourteenth. 7
The most prevalent penalties today are in the nature of fines, imprison-
ment and death.' 8 Of these the death penalty is attacked the most vehe-
mently. Abolitionists contend that it is contrary to modern standards of
morality and criminal justice and an affront to the personal value and
dignity of man. 9 The deterrent effect of the death penalty is questioned,
12See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (19,914
days in jail if fine not paid); United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.
1970) (5 year sentence for refusal to be inducted into the armed forces). But see
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); United States ex rel. Bongiorno v.
Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. II. 1944) (199 year sentence held valid). See generally
Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970).
13See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947).
14The concept of dehumanizing punishment was explained in Trop where the
court held that denationalization for the crime of desertion from the armed forces
was cruel and unusual because it stripped a man of his citizenship and placed him
at the mercy of the world. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See also Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
15 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
16 It has been a matter of conjecure whether there is any individual significance
in the words "cruel" and "unusual." The most reasonable conclusion is that the
phrase is conceptual, and that the technical definitions of the words, their order,
or whether they are to be used conjunctively or disjunctively are matters of academic
concern only.
It has been said that the term "cruel and unusual" is latently ambiguous. Gottlieb,
Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 268, 281 (1961).
17 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); United States v. McKinney,
427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright
v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760 (D.
Colo. 1968).
18The crimes for which the death penalty is still exacted has decreased. See
McCafferty, Major Trends in the Use of Capital Punislment, XXV FED. PRoB. 15
(Sept. 1961).
Some states do retain remnants of earlier forms of corporal punishment. See, e.g.,
State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963).
19The arguments for and against the death penalty may be classed into tvo gen-
eral categories-those that are dogmatic and those that are empirical. It has been
suggested, however, that the scientific approach may be actually only a disguise for
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and it is contended that if any deterrent effect is in fact realized, it could
be achieved as effectively through less severe means.2 Abolitionists feel that
the certainty of being punished is a greater deterrent than the severity of the
punishment." It is also argued that modem objectives of penology are
rehabilitation and reformation and that by executing the convict society
loses the opportunity to realize these objectives.2
Retentionists, on the other hand, argue that a deep-rooted objective of
criminal justice requires severe penalties to deter the commission of heinous
crimes.23 As evidence of the death penalty's deterrent effect proponents
irrational feeling. See Sellin, The Death Penalty, ALI MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent.
draft no. 9, 1959) (hereinafter cited as Sellin, MODEL PENAL CODE].
The moral objections to the death penalty are based on religious and philosophical
ideals. Society and the whole of mankind suffer by the removal of even one man,
thus upsetting the equilibrium of nature. Even if mankind generally is not harmed,
the value of life itself is diluted and the dignity of man is discounted by the imposi-
tion of the death penalty.
Concepts of fairness are also violated when one considers the possibility that
innocent persons may be wrongfully executed. See Hockhammer, The Capital Punish-
ment Controversy, 60 J. CuM. L.C. & P.S. 360 (1969).
20Abolitionists argue that people abstain from anti-social behavior because of a
feeling of obligation to behave lawfully. See Van Den Haag, On Deterrence and the
Death Penalty, 60 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 141, 142 (1969).
It is also argued that the death penalty may even increase the instance of certain
crimes. Once a criminal has committed a capital offense he may feel that he has
nothing to lose by killing hostages or police. See also People v. Cash, 52 Cal. 2d 841,
345 P.2d 462 (1959) where the defendant, after unsuccessful attempts to commit
suicide, committed a capial crime so that the state would execute him.
21The last execution in this country was in June 1967. If, however, the death
penalty is to have any deterrent effect at all there must be certainty that it will be
carried out. See Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitu-
tional, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 1773 (1970); Leisse, The Supreme Court and Cruel and
Unusual Punishment from Wilkerson to Witherspoon and Beyond, 14 ST. Louis LJ.
463 (1970); Sellin, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 19, at 20; Comment, The Death
Penalty Cases, 56 CALu. L. REv. 1268 (1969).
22Belief in a scientific approach to the understanding of the motive forces of
human conduct, which is the result of the growth of the behavioral sciences in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has brought about great changes in the discussion
about the aims of criminal justice. See generally Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Crum. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959); Van Den Haag,
On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60 J. Ciu. L.C. & P.S. 141, 147 n.11 (1969).23 See, e.g., Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (dissent);
Murdy, A Moderate View of Capital Punishment, XXV FED. PRo. 11 (Sept. 1961).
.Another aim allegedly achieved by the imposition of the death penalty is eugenic
exclusion of abnormal human strains by making impossible the future procreation of
criminal offenders. The efficacy of this proposal is questionable, and the same ob-
jective could be achieved as well by sterilization. See Sellin, Capital Punishment,
XXV FED. PRos. 3 (Sept. 1961). See generally Note, In Defense of Capital Punishment,
54 Ky. LJ. 742 (1966).
19711
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
point to the number of people who do not commit capital offenses." They
also argue that the death penalty insures that dangerous criminals will not
be paroled to repeat their crimes. 5 Society demands protection. Indeed, it
is sometimes argued, an outraged community might resort to lynch law if
the death penalty were removed for certain crimes.26
The debate over the policy behind the death penalty has continued for
centuries27 and though pressure for its abolition is widespread, it is still
utilized in most states for various types of crime. Attacks upon its consti-
tutionality on the theory that it is cruel and unusual, either as to method
of execution or severity of the penalty itself have, to date, proved unsuc-
cessful.29 The United States Supreme Court has had several opportunities
recently to decide the constitutionality of the death penalty but has either
refused certiorari"0 or has decided the cases on other grounds. 1
24 See, e.g., ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964), where the author
recognizes the argument and states:
It must surely be apparent that the criminal law has a general preventative func-
tion to perform in the interests of public order and of security of life, limb,
and possessions. Indeed, there is reason to assert that the influence of criminal
sanctions on the millions who never engage in serious criminality is of greater
social importance than their impact on the hundreds of thousands who do. Id. at
31.
25 Some feel that in our modern penal system there is no actual permanent isolation
of offenders and that parole or pardon will return the criminal to society to commit
another crime. See, e.g., Note, In Defense of Capital Punishment, 54 Ky. L.J. 742 (1966).
26 If the public felt that the law was not protecting it or was not dispensing justice
then the public might feel the need to resort to extra-legal means to do so. For some
statistics and comments on this point see Sellin, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 19,
at 16.
27 Organized attack on the death penalty dates from 1764 when C. Beccaria pub-
lished his essays on crimes and punishments, which proposed individualized punish-
ment based on the character of the offender. See D'Esposito, Sentencing Disparity:
Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 182 (1969).
The chief arguments for and against the death penalty have remained relatively
unchanged though the meaning of the arguments has changed along with concepts
of justice and morality. Today society has abolished torture as a means of executing
the death penalty and more humane methods are constantly being sought. Indeed,
some of the deterrent effect may have been lost by hiding the executions from the
public. See Sellin, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 19, at 18.
28 Since 1930, 98% of the executions in the United States have been for murder
and rape. Bedau, The Courts, The Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 12 UTAH L.
REv. 201, 204 (1968).
29 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760 (D. Colo. 1968). But cf.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 70 (1968); Ralph v. Warden, - F.2d - (4th
Cir. 1970), reh. denied, - F.2d - (4th Cit. 1971); Calhoun v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 496,
214 S.W. 335 (1919).
ao See, e.g., Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ventured into this area
of unbounded complexity and in Ralph v. Warden"2 held that the death
penalty is an unconstitutional sentence for the crime of rape where the
victim's life is neither taken nor endangered. The defendant had threatened
the lives of the victim and her son and then raped her. Although the victim
was genuinely in fear for her life, a medical examination revealed no out-
ward physical injury or psychological trauma. The court explained that
under these circumstances the sentence of death was so disproportionate to
the defendant's culpability and excessive in view of present standards of
decency that it violated the Eighth Amendment.3 3 The court also reasoned
that in view of the great number of rapes in this country and the small
number of convicted rapists who receive the death penalty, the selection
of the death penalty in a case where there is less than the greatest aggrava-
tion evidences arbitrariness.3"
The court's approach in Ralph responds to the questions posed by Justice
US. 889 (1963); Rudolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 899 (1963); Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368 (1963), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 944 (1965); Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
959 (1966); State v. Alvarez, 182 Neb. 358, 154 N.W.2d 746 (1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 823 (1968); Williams v. State, 427 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 926 (1968).
3 1 See, e.g, Maxwell v. Bishop, 399 U.S. 262 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
32-F.2d - (4th Cir. 1970), reh. denied, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1971).
33The Maryland Statute provided for penalties ranging from eighteen months to
death. MD. CODa ANN. art. 27, § 461 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
The dissent in the denial for rehearing argued that Ralph's culpability was indeed
great, however. Ralph had premeditatedly broken into the victim's home in the
late nighttime, pulled the light box, and threatened the victim and her son with
death. He then raped her and committed sodomy. There was also evidence that
Ralph had confessed to other rapes.
Chief Judge Haynesworth explained in concurring in the denial of the rehearing
that there is a "qualitative difference between life and death which cannot be readily
disregarded." To justify the death penalty for the crime of rape there must be
not only the endangering of life but lasting injury. See Ralph v. Warden, - F.2d
-(4th Cir. 1970), reb. denied, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1971).
34The death penalty is a discretionary alternative under the Maryland statute.
Ralph argued, as have others, that he received the death penalty because he is a
Negro and the victim was a white woman. The court noted this argument but did
not address itself to it, concluding that there were too many variables involved
that could affect the sentence. See, e.g., Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc., and the National Office for the Rights of the Indigent as Amicus
Curiae, Ralph v. Warden, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1970). See also, Note, 22 WAsH.
& Luz L. REv. 43 (1965).
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Goldberg in his dissent to denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama.3 5
Both opinions draw from the precept of justice propounded in Weems v.
United States6 that punishment must be graduated or proportioned to the
offense. More recently, Trop v. Dulles7 added to this concept by stating
that "the [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""8 The
Fourth Circuit decided that the legislative trend to abolish the death
penalty for rape and the fact that no one has been executed for rape 9
since 1964 evidences sufficient evolution of the moral standard to limit the
.death penalty to the most aggravated instances.4"
-35375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Brennan & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted):
(1) In light of the trend both in this country and throughout the world against
punishing rape by death, does the imposition of the death penalty by those States
which retain it for rape violate "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of our maturing society," or "standards of decency more or less uni-
versally accepted"?
(2) Is the taking of human life to protect a value other than human life con-
sistent with the constitutional proscription against "punishments which by
their excessive . . . severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged"?
(3) Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g., deterrence, isolation, rehabilita-
tion) be achieved as effectively by punishing rape less severely than by death
(e.g., by life imprisonment); if so, does the imposition of the death penalty for
rape constitute "unnecessary cruelty"?
The court in Ralph did not go so far as to hold that the penalty is unconstitu-
tional per se, but it did adhere to the idea that only the protection of life itself
justifies the use of the death penalty.
For comment and analysis see D'Esposito, Sentencing Disparity: Causes a.d Cures,
60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 182 (1969); Leisse, The Supreme Court and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment From Wilkerson to Witherspoon and Beyond, 14 ST. Louis L.J. 463 (1970);
Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Packer].
36 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
37 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
38 Id. at 101.
39 The court noted that only four countries and sixteen states still use the death pen-
alty for rape. It follows, the court reasoned, that countries and states that have abolished
it consider it excessive. Such use of comparative law is considered a valid measure of
standards of decency. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 n.38 (1958); Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 21 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). But see Packer, supra note 35, at 1073-74.
40The legislative trend away from the death penalty for rape may eventually
prompt a court to hold that the death penalty for rape is unconstitutional. Ralph
was only concerned with the disproportionality in this case, however. The best
evidence before the court on the issue of the mood of the community was the fact
that there is a moratorium on the execution of these convicts. If society questions
the validity of the penalty itself, then surely if it is to be used at all it should be
used only in the extreme case.
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The nature of the crime of rape and the interest to be guarded are im-
portant in interpreting the Ralph holding. The interests to be guarded are
the dignity of womanhood and her physical and psychological integrity.4'
The hazards involved in rape are the chance of unwanted pregnancy, the
chance of contracting venereal disease and the mental and physical injuries
to the person. All of these interests are violated to some degree by the act
of sexual intercourse by force against the will of the victim without other
aggravating circumstances.42 The Ralph decision does not discount these
interests nor does it question the legislature's wisdom in providing for the
death penalty as a maximum punishment. It does recognize, as did the
Maryland legislature in providing for a wide range of punishments, that
there is a wide range in the culpability of rapists and that the highest
penalty should be reserved for those most culpable. The death penalty is
still valid in cases where the victim's life is taken or endangered. No problem
arises in applying this standard in a case where life is actually taken, blt
determining when life has been endangered promises to present grave diffi-
culties. 3
The court recognized that life is endangered in many felony situations
It is still difficult to be certain that the imposition of the death penalty would
shock the conscience of the community when it is not possible to ascertain what the
community feels. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (1952). But see
Cahn, Autbority and Responsibility, 51 COLuM. L. REv. 838 (1951).
41 "Rape is one of the highest crimes against civilized society...." Carroll v.
State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523, 531 (1963). However, the emotional impact
of rape on society also makes the crime susceptible to use as a tool of pure vengeance.
Even the definition of the interest to be guarded is stated in emotional terms. See,
e.g, Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1964).
Though the emotional impact should be recognized, it should not be forgotten
that rape is a serious crime, and that it poses a grave threat to the safety of women.
See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970) (defendant and an accomplice
raped a girl several times and beat her, but the defendant received only a one year
sentence). See also Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896); Calhoun v. State, 85
Tex. Crim. 496, 214 S.W. 335 (1919).
42 Many factors could combine to aggravate the crime of rape. See, e.g., Butler
v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So. 2d 631 (1970) (four Negroes held a young boy at
gun point while they raped his date); Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966)
(nine year old girl raped and hospitalized).
43Life can be endangered by so many acts that as a standard the concept of
endangering life is not certain enough to be of value. Bodily injury appears to be
the real standard that is required under Ralph, however.
Some states make a distinction based on bodily injury for punishment purposes.
See NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.363 (1968); Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphia of
Pennsylvania's Increased Penalties for Rape and Attempted Rape, 59 J. CRim. L.C.
& P.S. 509 (1968).
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and that, absent physical evidence that life was endangered, it is a difficult
fact to determine. The Ralph court implied that actual physical or psycho-
logical injury of a permanent nature must accompany the act to justify the
imposition of the death penalty for rape."
Traditionally trial court sentences have not been susceptible to review
except where there has been gross abuse of discretion." Any sentence de-
livered under a constitutionally valid statute has been accepted as valid."6
The Ralph case transcends the problem of review of sentence and imposes
a constitutional standard upon the court's discretion for sentencing in rape
cases.
Many courts, when faced with determining a community or society stan-
dard, have viewed it as a policy matter for the legislature and have refused
to venture into that territory. However, the Ralph court invalidated the
sentence, not the statute and, therefore, did not invade the legislature's
domain."
This decision demonstrates the pressing necessity for viable standards for
juries and courts to use in sentencing persons convicted of crimes.4" Though
the case is technically limited to a narrow factual situation other courts may
well be induced to follow Ralph in limiting the imposition of the death
penalty for other capital crimes.49
E.D.B., C.J.S., Jr.
44The court stated that "there are rational gradations of culpability that can be
made on the basis of injury to the victim." Certainly this is true, and physical injury
does provide a more concrete standard. See also Ralph v. Warden, - F.2d - (4th
Cir. 1970), reb. denied, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1971). In the denial for rehearing Chief
Justice Haynesworth compared the difference in sentences for the crime of murder and
attempted murder, noting that the only difference was the death of the victim which is
immaterial to the defendant's culpability.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966); Faulkner v. State,
445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968).46 See, e.g., Stephens v. Warden, 382 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1967); Overstreet v. United
States, 367 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1966); Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1934).
But see Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968).
4 7 But see Ralph v. Warden, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1970), reb. denied, - F.2d
- (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., dissenting), where Judge Boreman in dissenting to
the denial for rehearing argues that the decision actually legislates in that it amends
the Maryland statute to apply in a particular factual situation.
48 Several states have adopted procedures for reviewing sentences. See, e.g,
ALAsKA CONsT., art. 1, § 2. See also ABA Project on Mininum Standards for Criminal
Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Reiew (Approved Draft, 1968).
49 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (robbery); Craig v. State,
179 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966) (rape where the de-
fendant threatened the victim with a screwdriver).
